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INTRODUCTION
Innovation-related international organs, and primarily the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
traditionally have been under performed in offering a comprehensive
innovation policy for all countries, particularly for developing countries. This
issue has been highlighted both before and throughout the establishment of
the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement. It was therefore only natural that upon
its adoption, TRIPS merely consisted of a flat intellectual property “one-sizefits-all” policy for all WTO-members. In so doing, it implicitly corresponded
with an earlier exemplary “Pax-American” World Bank-led neoclassical
economic growth approach. Similarly, it should not come as a surprise that
the WIPO remains to this day inconsistent in its preferred theoretical setting
for innovation-led growth, as witnessed in the organization’s archetypical
Development Agenda adopted in October 2007, after years of deliberations.
As such, only few issue-based coalitions emerged over innovation-led
growth or intellectual property-related policies.1 The exception to the above
finding, of course, is the existence of two structural alternatives that remain
outside the scope of this article. The first is the loose compilation of civil
society groups and movements, including numerous governments and
individuals converging over broad egalitarian principles promoted by iconic
movements, such as the Access to Knowledge (A2K) or the broad reaching
Open Source movement. The second alternative to such issue-based
coalitions is a plethora of overly generalized regional coalition blocs, such as
the African Group or the European Union. These all-purpose regional blocs
fail, however, to account for a more accurate delineation of cherry-picked
countries converging over issue-based innovation-led growth or intellectual
property-related policies.
1. See Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development, in
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
79, 81–86 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009) [hereinafter Yu 2009]; John S. Odell & Susan K.
Sell, Reframing the Issue: the WTO Coalition on Intellectual Property and Public Health, 2001, in
NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 85, 104 (John S. Odell
ed., 2006) (discussing the coalition of developing countries for the 2001 Doha Declaration on the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Public
Health); Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property StandardsSetting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 784 (2002) (suggesting that India, Brazil, Nigeria, and
China could form a “Developing Country Quad” - a leading working group on key negotiations);
Gunnar Sjostedt, Negotiating the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in
INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION: APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF
COMPLEXITY 44, 44–54 (I. William Zartman ed., 1994) (explaining coalition strategies leading to the
negotiation of the TRIPS agreement during the Uruguay Round).
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Nonetheless, de facto heterogeneity among countries over other
economic-related growth policies is commonly witnessed in a variety of WTO
coalitions. In particular, country coalitions are increasingly becoming the
informal preferred response of developing countries to imbalances in power at
the WTO. In response to the few under-theorized innovation and intellectual
property-related coalitions, this article offers a unique clustering analysis. It
does so within the framework of endogenous growth theory, measuring
optimal convergence by country coalitions into multiple innovation-based
growth equilibria rather than through a single “one-size-fits-all” theoretical
setting. The measurement is based on countries’ patent propensity rates as
proxy for their domestic innovation rates. Convergence literature herein
contributes a seminal analytical insight, codenamed club convergence.2 As
the term suggests, club convergence is the hypothesis whereby only countries
that are similar in their structural characteristics and which have similar initial
conditions will converge with one another.
Thus, one potential innovation-led growth hypothesis could be that richer
OECD countries may shape one convergence club, the developing countries
an additional club, and the underdeveloped yet another. Alternatively,
different club convergence groupings may be telling of how countries and
groups thereof converge—or ought to—over innovation-led growth and
related intellectual property policies.
Part I offers a positive theoretical framework based on endogenous
growth theory and convergence analysis, briefly introduced above. Part II
follows with a supporting empirical model, which serves as a unique
statistical model, while contributing to a regional convergence club
understanding of endogenous growth theory. The model carries out cluster
analyses for sixty-six innovating countries at two different points during the
1996–2011 time period, namely at the beginning and end of the period, as
well as measuring performance throughout the entire period. That is, it
functions in order to detect groups of countries that were similar in their
patent propensity rates as proxy for their domestic innovation rates. The
model delineates two large patent propensity-gaps and convergence patterns
within the world economy. The first gap refers to the great distance that
separates the middle group of “followers” from the stronger “leaders” in
terms of patent propensity capabilities. The second gap similarly refers to the
impressive gap that separates the weaker “marginalized” from the followers

2. See, e.g., Fabio Canova & Albert Marcet, The Poor Stay Poor: Non-Convergence Across
Countries and Regions, 2 (London Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 1265, 1995),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=289497; Oded Galor, Convergence? Inferences from
Theoretical Models, 106 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 1056, 1056 (1996).
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clubs.
Part III then follows with numerous theoretical ramifications of the
findings of Parts I and II. These ramifications relate to the need for additional
corroborating research intended to explain remaining discrepancies regarding
shifts and reversals in rates of regional convergence. Thus far, there is a lack
of evidence for the slowness or nonexistence of inner club convergence,
especially in advanced economies, but also in emerging ones.
I. PATENT CLUB CONVERGENCE: THE POSITIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Convergence Over Innovation-led Growth
Evidence increasingly shows that developing countries differ not only in
their propensity to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), trade, and
technology, but also in their abilities to innovate.3 Moreover, much evidence
increasingly foretells how developing countries differ in their ability to make
use of intellectual property rights as a tool for fostering domestic innovation.4
All of these startling pieces of evidence are found against the backdrop of a
traditional World Bank-led inflexible North/South country group dichotomy,

3. See U.K COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 2 (2002) (“Thus developing countries are far from homogeneous, a fact
which is self-evident but often forgotten. Not only do their scientific and technical capacities vary,
but also their social and economic structures, and their inequalities of income and wealth.”); see also,
Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The PostWTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265, 275–90 (2010) (analyzing the heterogeneity among developing
countries, codenamed the “Developing Inequality Principle”).
4. See José L. Groizard, Technology Trade, 45 J. DEV. STUD. 1526, 1539–40 (2009) (using
panel data of eighty countries for the period 1970–1995, while finding that FDI is higher for
countries with stronger IPRs). On the other hand, the author shows a negative relationship between
IPR and human capital indicators that exist in tandem. Earlier findings are similarly ambiguous.
While some works generally find a positive effect, Walter G. Park in his article Do intellectual
property rights stimulate R&D and productivity growth? Evidence from cross-national and
manufacturing industries data, Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, Industry Canada, Ottawa, 1 vol. 9 (2005) and Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does
Intellectual Property Protection Spur Technological Change? 55 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 235, 258–
59 (2003), others explain that lower IPR can facilitate imitation, while on the other hand, innovation
in developing countries increases in proportion to greater IPR protection. Yongmin Chen & Thitima
Puttitanun, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries 78 J. DEV. ECON.
474, 474 (2005). See also Rod Falvey et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth 10
REV. DEV. ECON. 700, 703, 712 (2006) (using panel data of seventy-nine countries and four subperiods: 1975–1979, 1980–1984, 1985–1989, and 1990–1994, the authors find evidence of a positive
effect between IPR and economic growth for both low and high-income countries, but not for
middle-income countries. According to the latter, the positive relationship between IPR and
economic growth in low-income countries cannot be explained by the potential fostering of R&D and
innovation, but by the idea that stronger IPR protection promotes imports and inner FDI from highincome countries without negatively affecting the national industry based on imitation).
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or some variation thereof.5 Such an innovation policy setting continually
highlights the asymmetries between Northern countries, which are deemed to
generate innovative products and technologies, and Southern countries, which
are generally thought to consume them.6 Surely, some international organs
did not make a clear theoretical choice on the matter. WIPO or UNCTAD
traditionally have failed in adopting a proper innovation policy for developing
countries in particular. This challenge has been especially evident before and
throughout the establishment of the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement.7 It was,
therefore, only natural that upon its adoption, TRIPS merely consisted of a
flat intellectual property policy for all WTO-members, corresponding with an
earlier World Bank-led “Pax-American” neoclassical economic growth
model.8
It should not have come as a surprise, therefore, that WIPO remains to this
day inconsistent on this matter, as witnessed in the organization’s archetypical
Development Agenda adopted in October 2007 after years of deliberations.9
A convenient way to distinguish the two views is to ask: are poor
economies catching up with those already innovatively advanced, and thus

5. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 5–6 (2000) (describing the
asymmetrical distribution of technological innovation and consumption between Northern and
Southern countries); Paul Krugman, A Model of Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of
Income, 87 J. POL. ECON. 253, 253–58 (1979) (analyzing the TRIPS Agreement via the innovating
North and non-innovating South); see also discussion infra part I.C..
6. Krugman, supra note 5, at 254–55.
7. See World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int [hereinafter WIPO]
(providing official surveys); see also the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/index.html [hereinafter UN DESA]. For theoretical and
empirical studies, see Helge E. Grundmann, Foreign Patent Monopolies in Developing Countries:
An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. DEVELOPMENTAL STUD. 186 (1976); Jorge M. Katz, Patents, the Paris
Convention and Less Developed Countries, 24–27 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Center, Discussion
Paper No. 190, Nov. 1973); Douglas F. Greer, The Case against Patent Systems in Less-Developed
Countries, 8 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 223 (1973); Constantine Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function
in Developing Countries, 9 J. DEVELOPMENTAL STUD. 71, 89–90 (1972).
8. Benoliel & Salama, supra note 3, at 278; WIPO National Seminar on Intellectual Property,
The International Protection of Industrial Property: From the Paris Convention to the TRIPS
Agreement, WIPO/IP/CAI/1/03/2, 16 (Feb. 17, 2003) (by Michael Blakeney).
9. World Intell. Prop. Org., The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development
Agenda, at ¶ 45 (2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/
recommendations.html [hereinafter Adopted Recommendations] (“To approach intellectual property
enforcement in the context of broader societal interests and especially development-oriented
concerns, with a view that ‘the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology . . . .’”). Thus both neoclassical economics’ “technological transfer” and competing
endogenous contextual “societal interests” preside in tandem, implying much theoretical
inconsistency towards the matter regarding innovation-led growth. See discussion infra part I.C..
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richer? Or, instead, are they caught in some innovation-related poverty trap?10
These two Capitalist Space Economy questions traditionally have been
dominated by two opposing views as to the expected long-run trajectories of
regional development.11 The first of the two views, whereby poor economies
incipiently catch up with those already richer, rooted in neoclassical
equilibrium economics, holds that, provided there are no central barriers to the
function of market processes, in an integrated national economy there are
strong pressures leading to the general convergence of regional incomerelated indicators over time. Regional discrepancies can only be a short-term
state. That is the case, since such disparities will instigate self-correcting
movements in prices, wages, capital, and labor, thereby restoring the tendency
towards regional convergence.
The convergence hypothesis, whereby poor economies might “catch up,”
has generated a huge body of empirical literature which thus far has barely
addressed innovation or intellectual property-related economic growth by
developing countries.12 Instead, the most popular examples covered in the
literature include:
[C]onvergence [in] incomes between rich and poor parts of the
European Union; [convergence] in plant and firm size in industries; in
economic activity across different regions (states, provinces, districts,
or cities) within the same country; in asset returns and inflation rates
across countries in a common trade area; in political attitudes across
different groups; and in wages across industries, professions, and
geographical regions.13

10. Compare: Danny T. Quah, Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence 1 (Center for
Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 253, 1995) (posing a similar question broadly concerning
economic growth).
11. Ron Martin & Peter Sunley, Slow Convergence? The New Endogenous Growth Theory
and Regional Development, 74 ECON. GEOGRAPHY, 201, 201 (1998). Earlier accounts of
convergence among countries or country groups have mostly attributed to the understanding of
convergence over salaries, GDP and other macroeconomic income-related indications. Little
accounts for convergence over domestic technological creation as considered herein. See, Dan BenDavid, Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies, 55 J. OF DEV. ECON.155, 166–67 (1998).
12. Jérôme Vandenbussche et al., Growth, Distance to Frontier and Composition of Human
Capital, 11 J. ECON. GROWTH 97, 121–22 (2006) (using a panel of nineteen OECD countries
between 1960 and 2000, while using an endogenous growth model, authors show how as a country
increasingly experiences economic growth, it relies more and more on innovation); see, EMMANUEL
HASSAN, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE, 17 (2010 (providing additional general discussion of the argument); see also
discussion, infra Part III.
13. Quah, supra note 11, at 1. For the extended list of methodological examples, see also
Ben-David, supra note 11, at 167; STILIANOS ALEXIADIS, CONVERGENCE CLUBS AND SPATIAL
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The convergence hypothesis on per capita income convergence has
uncovered a profound and possibly inspiring empirical finding for innovationled growth analysis as well. It found through geographically disaggregating
poor and rich economies, such as within German reunification or the effects
of regional redistribution within individual countries and across the European
Union, that all appear to be converging towards each other at a steady,
consistent rate of two percent per year.14
In the meantime, convergence literature saw another convergence
regression. Codenamed club convergence,15 as the term suggests, is the
hypothesis whereby only countries that are similar in their structural
characteristics, and which have sufficiently similar initial conditions, will
inter-converge to one another. Thus, one potential innovation-led growth
hypothesis could be that richer OECD countries may form one convergence
club, developing countries will form another, and the underdeveloped yet
another. Alternatively, different club convergence groupings may show how
countries and groups thereof converge (or ought to) over innovation-led
growth.
To illustrate one seminal income-related club convergence finding,
numerous economists now negate that there is substantive convergence

EXTERNALITIES: MODEL AND APPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN EUROPE (2013);
Jonathan Eaton & Zvi Eckstein, Cities and Growth: Theory and Evidence from France and Japan 1–
40 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4612, 1994); Joan-María Esteban & Ray
Debraj, On the Measurement of Polarization, 62 ECONOMETRICA 819 (1994); Joep Konings, Gross
Job Flows and Wage Determination in the UK: Evidence from Firm-Level Data (1994) (unpublished
PhD thesis, LSE, London); Reinout Koopmans & Ana R. Lamo, Cross-Sectional Firm Dynamics:
Theory and Empirical Results from the Chemical Sector (Cen. For Econ. Performance, Working
paper No. 229 (1994); Danny Quah, Regional Convergence Clusters across Europe (Cen. For Econ.
Performance, Discussion Paper No. 274, 1994); Danny Quah, One Business Cycle and One Trend
from (Many) Many Disaggregates (Cen. For Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 873, 1994);
Martin & Sunley, supra note 11, at 210 (citing David M. Gould & Roy J. Ruffin, What determines
economic growth?, FED. BANK DALLAS ECON. REV. 25 (1993); Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-iMartin, Convergence across States and Regions, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 107
(1991) [hereinafter Convergence across]). For two of the earliest and most influential statements of
this view, see GEORGE H. BORTS & JEROME L. STEIN, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A FREE MARKET
(1964) (offering a classic study of regional development in the United States); Jeffrey G. Williamson,
Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns, 13
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 3, 3–5 (1965) (analyzing the evolution of regional income
differences in advanced industrial countries).
14. Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis, 106 ECON. J.
1019, 1028 (1996); Martin Larch, Regional Cross-Section Growth Dynamics in the European
Community, (European Inst., London School of Economics and Political Science, 1994); Danny
Quah, Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic Growth (European Econ. Rev., Discussion
Paper No. 154, 1993).
15. Canova & Marcet, supra note 2; Oded Galor, Convergence? Inferences from Theoretical
Models, 106 ECON. J. 1056, 1056 (1996).
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between these three abovementioned clubs.16 They further predict how the
broad inequalities between the different country groupings or clubs may
persist or even increase in years to come such that the cross-country income
distribution remains polarized.17
Club Convergence theory may, therefore, be attributed to the second
approach, known as regional divergence. In such cases, poor countries are
due to remain caught in a model poverty trap. Put differently, there would be
no necessary reason why regional growth based on either innovation or other
growth-related indicators should uphold convergence, even over the long run.
On the contrary, regional divergence may be said to be the most likely
outcome. As a case in point, models of regional growth advanced by writers
such as Perroux,18 followed by Myrdal,19 and Kaldor20 indeed predict that
regional incomes will tend to diverge. If left to their own devices, we are
told, market forces would become spatially disequilibrating, and economies of
scale and agglomeration would then lead to the collective concentration of
capital, labor, and output in certain regions at the expense of others. Uneven
regional development was thus found to be self-correcting, yet only within
convergence clubs and not among them.
A remaining seminal theoretical reformulation is known as conditional
convergence.21 Because convergence is conditional on the different structural
characteristics of each economy, for instance, its preferences, technologies,
rate of population growth, or government policy, different structural
characteristics imply that different countries will have varying steady-state
relative incomes or innovative capacity. Hence, the prediction is that the
growth of an economy will be a function of the fracture that divides it from its
own stable state.22 To test for conditional convergence, therefore, it is
necessary to hold the state of each economy as a constant as well.

16. Galor, supra note 15, at 1065–66.
17. Id.
18. François Perroux, Economic Space: Theory and Applications, 64 Q. J. ECON., 89 (1950)
[hereinafter Economic Space]; François Perroux, Note sur law Notion des Poles du Croissance [Note
on the Notion of a Growth Pole], 8 ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE 307 (1955).
19. GUNNAR MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDER-DEVELOPED REGIONS (1957).
20. The Case for Regional Policies, in THE ESSENTIAL KALDOR, 311 (F. Targetti & A.P.
Thirlwall eds., 1989) [hereinafter Case for Regional Policies]; The Role of Increasing Returns,
Technical Progress and Cumulative Causation in the Theory of International Trade and Economic
Growth, in THE ESSENTIAL KALDOR, supra note 20, at 327.
21. See Martin & Sunley, supra note 11, at 207–08; Sala-i-Martin, supra note 14, at 1026–27;
Robert J. Barro & Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, Convergence, 100 J, OF POL. ECON. 223 (1992); N.
Gregory Markiw et al., A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth, 107 Q. J. ECON. 407
(1992).
22. See generally Martin & Sunley, supra note 11, at 206–07.
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B. Coalitions and Convergence Clubs
Heterogeneity among countries over their economic growth is commonly
witnessed in a plethora of coalitions.23 In the absence of information
asymmetries and transaction costs convergence clubs and coalitions thereof
should efficiently correlate. In reality, country coalitions indeed are rapidly
“becom[ing] the de facto preferred response of developing countries to
imbalances in power [at the] WTO.”24 Such coalitions consequently impact
trade governance and WTO-related institutional reforms.25 To date, of the
112 WTO Members who define themselves as “developing countries,” ninetynine are members of one or more developing country groups or coalitions.26
23. Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal
Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 483, 483 (2007).
24. Vicente Paolo B. Yu III, Unity in Diversity: Governance Adaptation in Multilateral Trade
Institutions Through South-South Coalition-building 1-68, 28 (South Centre, Research Paper No. 17,
2008); see also AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT AND WTO (2003) [hereinafter NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE) (offering an historical typology of developing country coalitions in the GATT and WTO);
Rolland, supra note 23, at 483 (emphasizing that developing country-led coalitions are beginning to
change the WTO’s dynamics); NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND
NAFTA (J. Odell, ed., 2006); Jerome Prieur & Omar R. Serrano, Coalitions of Developing Countries
in the WTO: Why Regionalism Matters? (2006), available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/
sites/iheid/files/sites/political_science/shared/political_science/3458/Developing_20Countries_20Co
alitions_20in_20the_20WTO_20vrai.pdf; Constantine Michalopoulos, The Participation of the
Developing Countries in the WTO, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY (March 6,
2000)
http://www.iatp.org/documents/participation-of-the-developing-countries-in-the-wto-the-0.
See also Yu 2009, supra note 1, at 84; Odell & Sell, supra note 1, at 104; Drahos, supra note 1, at
780; Sjostedt, supra note 1 for an explanation of concerns over intellectual property-related
coalitions.
During the early years of the WTO, there were initial attempts at bringing together an
overarching group of developing countries (similar to the G-77 in UNCTAD), but these attempts
were later abandoned as it became clear that differing interests and institutional capacities posed ever
greater challenges to such a grouping. Michalopoulos, supra note 24.
In the pre-WTO era, developing country-led coalitions in the GATT received only limited
academic attention and were largely considered ineffective. Amrita Narlikar, Bargaining over the
Doha Development Agenda: Coalitions in the World Trade Organization 2 (Serie LATN Papers, No.
34, 2005) [hereinafter Narlikar, Doha Development Agenda] (“Developing countries, even while
operating in coalitions, had stood on the sidelines in the GATT, choosing to free-ride on the
concessions that were exchanged”). Narlikar adds that this neglect lay partly in the fact that
coalitions in the GATT were informal and harder to trace. Id.; Thematic Studies from a Ford
Foundation Project, in 1 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (John
Whalley ed., 1989); DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE: POLICIES AND BARGAINING
STRATEGIES (Diana Tussie & David Glover eds., 1993).
25. Mayur Patel, New Faces in the Green Room: Developing Country Coalitions and
Decision-Making in the WTO, (Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper No. 33,
2007); see also Faizel Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organization, 10 WORLD ECON. 109
(2009); Debra P. Steger, The Future of the WTO: The Case of Institutional Reform, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 803 (2009).
26. Yu III, supra note 24, at 28.
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For developing countries with small markets and limited diplomatic
resources, coalitions prove repeatedly to be the only means at their disposal
for advancing] their bargaining positions.27 The joint defense of a negotiating
position is likely to improve the legitimacy of a proposal in consensus-based
and majoritarian institutions. This explains why even developed countries
with large markets search for allies in the WTO.
It was during the run-up to and following the 1999 Seattle Ministerial
Conference that novel types of coalitions led by developing countries started
appearing—ranging from bloc-type groups such as the Like-Minded Group of
the late 1990s,28 to issue-based groups, such as the G-20 of the post-Cancun
period. Otherwise, coalitions appeared as region-based groups,29 such as the
African Group, or as groups that shared certain development characteristics
such as the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs).30
Moreover, region based groups, such as LDCs, remain central for
coalition-based action by many developing countries. In the meantime,
informal issue-based groups or coalitions, such as the G20, the G33 and the
NAMA-11,31 are also becoming a key means for group-based action by
developing countries. Of the coalitions in place as of late 2009, some
“[s]ixty-seven developing countries (or 58.77 percent of developing WTO
Members) have joined one or more informal issue-based developing country
coalitions” and “[s]ixty-one developing countries are [M]embers of a regional
group (including 35 which are also members of one or more issued-based
groups and 37 which are members of one or more common characteristic
groups).”32
27. NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE supra note 24, at 3.
28. See Amrita Narlikar & John Odell, The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining
Coalition: The Like Minded Group in the World Trade Organization, in NEGOTIATING TRADE:
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA, supra note 1, at 115–45 (discussing the
genesis, negotiating strategy, and results of the Like-Minded Group.
29. Prieur & Serrano, supra note 24, at 5–7; SISULE F. MUSUNGU, SUSAN VILLANUEVA &
ROXANA BLASETTI, UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH
SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS xiv (2004) (“[a] regional approach to the use of TRIPS
flexibilities will enable similarly situated countries to address their constraints jointly . . . .”). Further,
the authors offer two models of regional cooperation over IP-related policies, namely (a)
coordination, yet non-harmonization, has most commonly been adopted among the RECs in Latin
America and the Caribbean region, and (b) harmonization without coordination as is mostly
witnessed in Africa in the form of OAPI and ARIPO. Id., at 50–55. See Yu 2009, supra note 1, at 90,
(explaining “[r]egional or pro-development fora are particularly effective means for coordinating
efforts by less developed countries in the areas of public health, IP, and international trade.”).
30. Prieur & Serrano, supra note 24, at 5–7.
31. A group of eleven developing countries working toward strengthening NAMA. See Faizel
Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organization: Developing Countries in the Doha Round, Chapter
3: G20 and the NAMA 11: Developing Countries in the Doha Round 31-57 (2009).
32. Yu III, supra note 24, at 28 (emphasis added).
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These coalition building efforts surely play a role in the backdrop of much
United States-led opposition. Since the failure of the fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancún (Cancún Ministerial) in 2003, most noticeably, the
United States has largely engaged in a divide-and-conquer strategy intended
to marginalize coalition building by developing countries. The United States
henceforth has rewarded countries that were willing to work with it, while
undermining efforts by Brazil, India, and other G20 members to establish a
united negotiating front for less developed countries.33
The G20 is the most important example of a coalition of developing
countries developed during the pre-negotiation phase in the GATT.34 “The
G20 . . . is composed only of developing countries (later referred to as the
“G20+) . . . . [and] [t]his coalition of developing countries appeared just
before the WTO Cancun summit, attempting to block the joint US/EC
proposals.”35 In so doing, it favored negotiating with developed countries over
the issue of the inclusion of services in the agenda of the Uruguay Round.
“This group eventually merged with the G-9,36 a group of nine developed
countries, to form the “Café au Lait” group, from which negotiating proposals
eventually emerged that ‘provided the basis for the Punta del Este declaration
and the commencement of the Uruguay Round.’”37
The example of the G20 is telling for an additional reason. It foretells
how even in the midst of changes in the exact list of countries converging,
club convergence remains intact based on its exemplary core members. To
illustrate, as membership in the G20 coalition has changed at various points, it
33. Yu 2009, supra note 1, at 83–84; see also Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property
Powers, 18 (Drake Univ. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12–28); Robert B.
Zoellick, America will not wait, ACADEMIC CONSORTIUM ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Sept. 21,
2003) http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/acit/TopicsDocuments/Zoellick030921.pdf (“As WTO
members ponder the future, the US will not wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do
countries.”). In tandem, domestic U.S. private entities threaten or use of unilateral sanctions, as part
of their coalition with Europe, and Japan at the industry level. See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Public
Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
819, 844–46 (2003) (referring to the case of the pharmaceutical industry); SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE
POWER, AND PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
34. Composed of Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia,
Jamaica, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zaire (now DR Congo). The 128 Countries that had signed GATT by
1994, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2014), http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm.
35. Prieur & Serrano, supra note 24, at 8 (noting in a footnote that the G20+ includes
“Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and
Venezuela. With the addition of Egypt and Kenya, the group acquired the name of the G22.”).
36. Composed of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
37. Yu III, supra note 24, at 26 (citation omitted).
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has consisted of a core group of countries, in this case called the G3+3.38 This
group consists of the three biggest members: Brazil, China, and India. In
addition, three important middle powers preside: Chile, South Africa, and
Argentina.39
In reality, not all coalitions have prevailed. A case in point is the
establishment of the G-10 created during the pre-negotiation phase of the
Uruguay Round from 1982–1986.40 The coalition, led by Brazil and India,
opposed the launch of a new trade round, and was even more vocal in its
opposition to the inclusion of services in any trade negotiations within the
GATT.41 For the purposes of this article, it should be added that the G-10 was
equally opposed to the inclusion of the Agreement on trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) or the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS). It further refused to make a compromise on
any of these issues until its demands of standstill and rollback of non-tariff
barriers were met. The group was successful only in a limited way.42
An additional few, under-theorized WTO member issue-based coalitions
also continuously emerge over innovation-led growth and intellectual
property-related policies.43 Among them are the “Joint proposal (in
intellectual property)” Coalition,44 sponsoring a proposal calling for the
establishment of a Geographic Indications (GI) database and register,45 and its

38. Prieur & Serrano, supra note 24, at 8.
39. Id.
40. Yu III, supra note 24, at 26 (adding that the coalition of G-10 countries included
Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia).
41. Id. (citing Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications
for Future Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 285–86
(Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
42. Narlikar, Doha Development Agenda, supra note 24, at 6 (“Amidst this grand-standing,
the coalition also refused to engage with any other coalitions, and turned down overtures from other
developing countries to engage in shared research initiatives or draft joint proposals.”).
43. There still remains the alternative analytical framework of a plethora of present day loose
gatherings of civil society groups and movements, including governments and individuals
converging on egalitarian principles of justice, freedom, and economic development. These notably
include the Access to Knowledge movement, the Open Source movement, etc. See Jack Balkin, What
is Access to Knowledge?, BALKANIZATION (Apr. 21, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.co.il/2006/04/
what-is-access-to-knowledge.html; R.E. Wyllys, Overview of the Open-Source Movement, UNIV.
TEX. AUSTIN GRADUATE SCH. LIBR. & INFO. SCI. (2001), https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/
~l38613dw/readings/OpenSourceOverview.html (commenting on the open source movement).
44. A group of 20 WTO members including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chinese Taipei, South Africa, U.S. Groups in the WTO, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (July 1, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf.
45. Id.
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neighbor the W52 coalition,46 sponsoring a proposal for “modalities” in
negotiations on geographical indications. Other than these and only a handful
of similar examples, countries infrequently join efforts over innovation-led
growth and TRIPS-related concerns merely as part of their overly generalized
regional groupings. Such are the forty-two African Group members,47 the
thirty-one Asian developing members,48 the twenty-eight European Union
(EU) members,49 and, of course, the world’s fifty poorest countries,
codenamed the Least-developed countries (LDCs).50 These countries group
themselves, as discussed, notwithstanding their possibly contradicting
innovation-led economic growth interests as well as their innovation
capabilities. As archetypical bloc-type coalitions, the latter regional country
alignment could now be replaced by more issue-based coalitions over
innovation-led growth and intellectual property-related policies.
Bargaining coalitions, one will recall, are modeled along two ends of a
spectrum. On the one end there are bloc-type coalitions, and on the other
issue-based ones.51 The differences between the two are twofold, which also
explains why innovation and intellectual property-related policy coalitions
could at least in theory be more effectual.52 First, bloc-type coalitions bind
member countries through “a set of ideas and an identity that go beyond the
immediately instrumental; . . . [issue-based coalitions], as the name suggests,
are bound together by a more focused and instrumental aim[,]” instead of an
overly generalized developmental aim.53
A second reason in support of a transition to issue-based coalitions over
innovation and intellectual property-related policies follows. Blocs such as
the EU or LDCs usually unite like-minded countries.54 On the other hand,
“[i]ssue-based coalitions . . . often dissipate after the specific goal is achieved.
Bloc-type coalitions successfully address the problem of minimal external
weight . . . , but [they] also run the risk of fragmentation as they lack internal
coherence.”55 Another distinction is that “issue-specific coalitions enjoy
internal coherence, but are difficult to sustain when large diversified
46. A group of 109 WTO members. “The list includes as groups: the EU, ACP and African
Group.” Id.
47. Groups in the TRIPS Negotiations, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2014), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_groups_e.htm.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Narlikar, Doha Development Agenda, supra note 24, at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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economies with multiple sectoral interest groups are involved . . . .”56 Again,
such coalitions, if focused on innovation-led growth and intellectual property,
could have better chances of enduring—at least theoretically. In short,
developing country-led coalitions over innovation-led growth or intellectual
property-related policies are especially prone to integration. These countries
thus should prefer issue-based coalitions, as opposed to bloc-based ones.57
Equally, such coalitions arguably should not be overly specific, or they may
share the risk of disintegration by competing interests.58
C. Growth Theory and Convergence Over Innovation-led Growth
One more preliminary concern remains, namely, what is the proper
theoretical setting for issue-based coalitions? In the broader context of
growth theory, endogenous growth theory and the new growth empirics
naturally prevail. This is so much the case that growth theory prefers multiple
economic growth equilibria by numerous country groups or clusters59 over a
single international equilibrium of neoclassical economic growth setting.60
Recent discussion, as explained thus far, has focused mostly on long-term
convergence in per capita income and output indicators between countries.
Again, focusing on innovation-led economic growth, this article offers cluster
analysis based on yearly data from 1996–2011 for sixty-six countries.61 It
evaluates the linkage between national innovation as measured through the
56. Id.
57. See

Hamilton & Whalley, Coalitions in the Uruguay Round, 125
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV, 547, 556–57 (1989); Narlikar, Doha Development Agenda,
supra note 24, at 6.
58. Narlikar, Doha Development Agenda, supra note 24, at 6.
59. “[T]he assumption of [endogenous growth holds that] diminishing returns to capital
implicit in the neoclassical production function [(measuring income-based indicators among
countries), leads to] the prediction that the rate of return to capital (and therefore its growth rate) is
very large when the stock of capital is small and vice versa. Sala-i-Martin, supra note 14, at 1025;
see also Danny T. Quah, supra note 10, at 1.
60. This mainly empirical debate has promoted the development of endogenous growth
theory, which seeks to move beyond conventional neoclassical theory by treating as endogenous
those factors—particularly technological change and human capital— demoted as exogenous by
neoclassical growth models. Id.
61. A review of the dataset shows that an alphabetical list of the 66 countries with sufficient
statistical validity: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador,
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America, Uruguay, and Zambia.
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rate of issued United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patents
listed by Inventor Country (ICN) or United States Inventor State (IS) search
categories as proxy for state-of-the-art-technology. At the same time, it
accounts for a formulation of the sum and rate of supply of R&D, as measured
by countries’ Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD). The rate
between both, known also as the “Patent Propensity rate,” prefigures the
clusters therein. The statistical analysis has only recently been made possible
with the publication of highly detailed R&D-related datasets by the UNESCO
Institute for Statistics in 2011 covering all countries in full or in part.
This article contributes to the critique of the WTO’s TRIPS agreement as
well as the WIPO’s systematic evasion of intellectual property-related policy
delineations between distinct country groups and clusters thereof.62 The
TRIPS Agreement notably consists merely of an almost flat intellectual
property and related-innovation policy for all WTO-members.63 Against that
backdrop, TRIPS casted international intellectual property protection as a
central pillar for both short- and long-run economic growth, effectively
ignoring country group differences over innovation-led growth and related
intellectual property policies.
This argument stood for two long-run neoclassic exogenous economic
incentives offered by developed nations.64 The first incentive promised to
undertake positive efforts in the area of technology transfer—it being an
archetypical form of a reflexive innovation policy towards developing
62. While overriding country group classifications, WIPO’s policy is defined flatly towards
all non-LDCs members. The WIPO 2007 Development Agenda serves as a case in point. To
illustrate, Recommendation 1 (“WIPO technical assistance shall be, inter alia, development-oriented,
demand-driven and transparent, taking into account the priorities and the special needs of developing
countries, especially LDCs, as well as the different levels of development of Member States”) and
Recommendation 15 (“Norm-setting activities shall. . .take into account different levels of
development”). In one context referring to WIPO’s labeled ‘Technical assistance,’ Recommendation
1 acknowledges the need for its implementation to be as country-specific and context-sensitive
(“design, delivery mechanisms and evaluation processes of technical assistance programs should be
country specific “) Id.
For Theoretical and empirical studies, see Grundmann, supra note 7; Katz, supra note 7; Greer,
supra note 8; Vaitsos, supra note 7.
63. See Benoliel & Salama, supra note 3, at 278; Blakeney, supra note 8.
64. See, e.g., CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, 51
(Oxford University Press, 2009); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving
Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists,
and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 635 (2001) (relying on additional
sources therein); See also Christine Thelen, Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Tools for Securing
Successful TRIPs Implementation, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 519, 528–33 (2006)
(discussing four incentive mechanisms tailored for developing countries within TRIPS, namely
creating short and long-term economic growth, technical assistance, and additional time to become
compliant).
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countries as a whole.65 The second incentive assured agricultural trade.66
These incentives, backed by supportive agreements, were pivotal for the final
acquiescence of developing countries to the TRIPS agreement.67 Both
incentives also adhered implicitly to Solow’s neoclassical growth model,
formulated earlier on by economists Cass,68 and Koopmans,69 and earlier
contributors.70
More specifically, there still remains a predicament regarding the first
technological incentive of technology transfer.71 Initially, it was meant to act
as a force for convergence, because of the “advantage of backwardness”
conferred on technological laggards, as was initially put by Harvard
University economist Alexander in 1962.72 Later in his work, he offered a
pioneering idea which was called into action by neoclassical economists and
policy makers such as in the WTO’s TRIPS example.
As Gerschenkon explained, “technology gaps” between technologicallyedged (mostly developed) economies and laggard developing countries
provide the latter with immense opportunities for economic growth.73 Since
Gerschenkon, just about every theory of international income differences that

65. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2004); see also CORREA,
supra note 5, at 18 (focusing on developing countries’ concerns over increasing technological
transfer as a means of economic growth); see also Christine Thelen, supra note 64, at 528–29
(showing broader long-run economic growth concerns by developing countries).
66. Helfer, supra note 65, at 22; see also Clete D. Johnson, A Barren Harvest for the
Developing World? Presidential “Trade Promotion Authority” and the Unfulfilled Promise of
Agriculture Negotiations in the Doha Round, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 437, 464–65 (2004).
67. Helfer, supra note 65, at 22; see also Clete D. Johnson, supra note 66.
68. David Cass, Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation, 32 REV.
ECON. STUD. 233 (1965).
69. Tjalling Koopmans, On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth, in STUDY WEEK ON
THE ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 225 (Pontificia Academia Scientiarvm
1965).
70. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928); Robert
M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956); Trevor W.
Swan, Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation, 32 ECONOMIC RECORD 334 (1956).
71. The WIPO Development Agenda of 2007 noticeably illustrates the organization’s general
yet implicit inclination towards neoclassical economics-related policies, with technology transfer
being its archetypical example. See Adopted Recommendations, supra note 9, at Cluster C: 28 (“To
explore supportive intellectual property -related policies and measures Member States, especially
developed countries, could adopt for promoting transfer and dissemination of technology to
developing countries.”); see also, id., at Cluster C: 31 (“To undertake initiatives agreed by Member
States, which contribute to transfer of technology to developing countries, such as requesting WIPO
to facilitate better access to publicly available patent information.”).
72. See ALEXANDER GERSCHENKON, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, in
ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS 6–11 (1962).
73. Id. at 8–9.
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has taken technology transfer into account has implied that all countries share
the same long-run growth rate.74
The convergence, and lack thereof, over patent propensity by countries
worldwide, as proxy for their domestic innovation, corroborates the critique
of these neoclassical economics growth theoreticians. That critique, of
course, being over the difficulty of these theoreticians in explaining how
growth rates by poor countries remained significantly lower than the rest of
the world for almost two centuries.75 In sum, this article bears witness to
three innovation-based economic growth clusters that traverse both the
developed and developing countries’ alignments and may necessitate
innovation-led growth and related international intellectual property policy
adaptations.
II. THE MODEL
A. Methodology
The model adheres to five methodological principles. At the outset, the
analysis adheres to a formal statistical inference method to estimate the effect
and associated statistical significance of the two hypotheses below. The
statistical comparison over patent propensity rates between all sixty-six
innovating countries is modeled as follows. The number of patents
corresponding to each pair (year, country) depends on the country, the year,
the GERD invested (during the third previous year per Issued Patents in a
three year average delay at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO)), and the type.76
In the econometric model appropriate for present panel data, the
dependent variable is the expected value of the yearly number of issued
patents.77 The explanatory variables include country, GERD (as offset), year,
74. See, e.g., Susanto Basu & David N. Weil, Appropriate Technology and Growth, 113 Q. J.
ECON. 1025 (1998) (applying this notion to rich countries on the technological edge); Daron
Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, Productivity Differences, 116 Q. J. ECON.563 (2001); Stephen L.
Parente & Edward C. Prescott, Technology Adoption and Growth, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 3733, 1991) (applying the notion for countries in which technology transfer can
be blocked by local special interests); Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, Monopoly Rights: A
Barrier to Riches, 89 AM. ECON. REV.1216 (1999); Daron Acemoglu et al., Distance to Frontier,
Selection and Economic Growth, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 37 (2002) (referring to countries with
institutions that do not permit full advantage to be taken of technology transfer.).
75. Peter Howitt & David Mayer-Foulkes, R&D, Implementation and Stagnation: A
Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence Clubs, 37 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, 147, 149
(2005).
76. The type effect is statistically assumed to be changing throughout time.
77. The statistical assumption is that the number is distributed as a Negative Binomial. The
latter type of distribution is a distribution of discrete probability of the number of successes in a
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and type, changing throughout time. The longitudinal structure of the data
(panel data) induces serial correlation between yearly observations
corresponding to the same country, which were taken into account by the
model.
The following panel data counting method relates to the choice of a patent
category search with the USPTO dataset. It is pursued twofold. Firstly, as
previously stated, the model analyzes USPTO Issued Patents. It does so as
issued patents effectively serve as proxy for R&D-related state-of-the-art
quality output assurance, which the model uniquely incorporates. To explain,
patent series are by nature subject to a substantial bias, with most patents
generating low or no value and only a few patents being associated with high
economic and financial value. Thus far, patent statistics studies have rarely
tested thoroughly the quality sensitivity of the results of their patent count
methodology or their data source.78
The qualitative methodological
improvement herein counts archetypical state-of-the-art technology that has
successfully culminated as issued patents, instead of the mere filing of related
patent applications. This methodological choice is related to a concern over
the possibility that a quantity of innovative activity does not begin or
otherwise conclude the patenting process.79 Surely, only state-of-the-art
technology that completes the USPTO patenting process is accounted for as
issued patents. It is, therefore, a limitation of patent statistics to measure
patent applications as an indication of quality innovation.80
Another approach within the patent statistics literature has partly met this
qualitative challenge. The approach proffers that instead of seeking to make
inferences about the propensity to patent by estimating the patent production
function, data must be collected based on directly asking firms about the

sequence of Bernoulli trials before a specified (non-random) number of failures (denoted r) occur. In
statistical terms, a Bernoulli trial is each repetition of an experiment involving only 2 outcomes. See
JOSEPH M. HILBE, NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION 81–84 (2007).
78. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT., OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011 (2011), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/scienceand-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-scoreboard-2011_sti_scoreboard-2011-en;
Jérôme Danguy, Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The R&D - Patent
relationship: An industry perspective (ECARES, Working Paper 2010-038, 2010) available at
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/73257/1/2010-038-DANGUY_DERASSENFOSSE_
VANPOTTELSBERGHE-therd.pdf.
79. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and
Methodological Tools 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8498, 2001).
80. Patent statistics literature has irregularly considered this limitation. The earliest, most
important contribution begins with Professor Zvi Griliches’ article titled “Patent Statistics as
Economic Indicators: A Survey. Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,
28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661 (1990); See also Daniele Archibugi & Mario Pianta, Measuring
Technological Change through Patents and Innovation Surveys, 16 TECHNOVATION 451 (1996).
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fraction of innovations they generally patent.81 This approach allows for the
assembly of a calculate of the propensity to patent that is closely in line with
the theoretical definition of the propensity to patent as the fraction of
innovations that are accounted for as USPTO issued patents.
There are two additional methodological challenges concerning patent
propensity measurement of developing countries per se. The first is the
method whereby patent propensity rates could be measured as the percentage
of innovations for which a patent application is filed.82 Yet in the case of
developing countries in particular, often too many patent applications do not
lead to patent issuance, neither nationally or at the USPTO level. This study,
therefore, corresponds with the above mentioned methodological definition of
the propensity to patent as the percentage of patentable inventions that are in
fact patented.83
A second patent panel data counting method and challenge, relating to the
particularities of the USPTO dataset, follows. It maintains that patents are
analyzed by the USPTO Inventor Country (ICN) or United States Inventor
State (IS) search categories. These categories contain the country or state of
residence of the inventor at the time of patent issue.84 The ICN search
category indicates the inventiveness of the local laboratories and labor force
of a given country. This second counting method has never been used in
earlier methods of determining propensity to patent research, and enjoys three
important advantages in comparison to all of the above mentioned methods of
accounting for patent applications or other quantitative variations. Firstly, it
replaces the “Patent Affiliate” or “Owner” alternative USPTO search
categories, which mostly represent patenting activity by multi-national
81. Kleinknecht, Van Montfort and Brouwer offer to replace patent/R&D rate analysis with
measuring expenditure on innovation (including non-R&D-expenditure), sales of innovative products
known which may be interpreted as an indicator of imitation, or otherwise innovation not introduced
earlier by competitors, which may be interpreted as an indicator of ‘true’ innovation. Alfred
Kleinknecht, Kees Van Montfort & Erik Brouwer, The Non-trivial Choice Between Innovation
Indicators, 11 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH., 109, 113–14, 117 (2002) (analyzing five
alternative innovation indicators: R&D, patent applications, total innovation expenditure, and shares
in sales taken by imitative and by innovative products measured in the Netherlands).
82. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 16–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000); see also Anthony Arundel & Isabelle Kabla, What Percentage of
Innovations Are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms, 27 RES. POL’Y 127 (1998);
Emmanuel Duguet & Isabelle Kabla, Appropriation Strategy and the Motivations to use the Patent
System: An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level in French Manufacturing, 49/50 ANNALES
D’ÉCONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE [ANNALS ECON. STAT.] 289 (1998); Edward Deering Mansfield,
Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, MGMT. SCI. 32, 173–181 (1986).
83. Id.
84. Tips on Fielded Searching, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://patft.uspto.gov/
netahtml/PTO/help/helpflds.htm (last visited May 13, 2014).
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enterprises originating in advanced economies.85 Secondly, the measurement
of the ICN or IS search categories operate to minimize transaction costs
associated with domestic patenting by developing countries.
Thirdly, an additional methodological advantage with the ICN search
category choice concerns co-invention measurement. In such cases, at least
one of the inventors belonging to an emerging economy may be foreign and
possibly belong to an advanced economy nationality.86 Indeed, the solution
presented through the ICN search category may account for either sole or coinventions. All the same, USPTO co-inventions, at least from OECD
nationalities, comprise roughly one percent of total inventions patented at the
USPTO.87
With that said, there is need to account for the methodological choice
whereby using the issued patent search category, this study focuses solely on
USPTO patenting activity. The reason for not expanding this article beyond
the USPTO onto the European or Japanese patent office is because they are
undependable. To date, neither of the two other leading patent offices, the

85. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, OECD Patent Statistics
Manual (2009), available at http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/free/9209021e.pdf
[hereinafter Statistics Manual]; Anna Bergek & Maria Bruzelius, Patents with Inventors from
Different Countries: Exploring Some Methodological Issues through a Case Study, Presented at the
DRUID Conference, Copenhagen, 27-29 June, available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/
viewpaper.php?id=2694&cf=18.
86. Statistics Manual, supra note 85.
87. The exact rates of co-inventorship in emerging economies is still unaccounted for. A
seminal 2014 article by Jérôme Danguy, titled: Globalization of Innovation Production: A PatentBased Industry Analysis (iCite Working Paper 009, 2014), provides important insight albeit limited
mostly to OECD countries. Danguy’s study is based on a panel dataset composed of 21
manufacturing industries covering the period (defined by the priority date of the patent filing) from
1980 to 2005. As he shows in 2005, only 2% of Priority filings (incorporating all the patents filed by
the inventors (or applicants) based in a country, regardless of the patent office of application) (8% for
EPO) were subject to international co-invention. Danguy adds that less than 5% represented crossborder ownership of innovation (18% for EPO); and only 1% of PF (2% for EPO) were subject to
international co ownership. Id., at 10. Surely, as said the sample is mainly restricted to OECD
countries representing about 90% of the worldwide patenting activities. Yet to be sure the sample
considers international collaboration with all the countries in the PATSTAT database including
emerging economies. Id., at fn. 12.
Two additional studies offer partial account for China and India. To begin with, Lee
Branstetter, Guangwei Li and Francisco Veloso, in their article titled: The Rise of International Coinvention, NBER, (October 2013) (available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13028.pdf),
Branstetter et al., empirically explain that India’s and China’s increase in U.S. patents are to a great
extent driven by MNEs from advanced economies. Thus and in accordance with the present study
illustration of relatively low patent propensity rates in emerging economies, Lee Branstetter et al.,
conclude that simply counting Chinese or Indian patent grants per their patent propensity
significantly exaggerates their overall national innovative activity. A second study on China follows.
See, Jennifer Chen, Show-Ling Jang, and Chiao-Hui Chang, The Patterns and Propensity for
International Co-invention: The Case of China, 94 SCIENTOMETRICS 481 (2013).
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European (EPO) nor the Japanese (JPO), which, when including the USPTO,
are jointly referred to as the Triadic Patent family (consolidated to eliminate
double counting of patents filed at different offices),88 offer equivalent
Inventor Country Nationality (ICN) search categories.
Furthermore, the rationales underlying the focus on USPTO-based
patenting activity instead of the alternative aggregation of national patenting
systems of both advanced and emerging economies are also twofold. The first
is that countries, especially in the developing world, do not have the same
patentability criteria.89 A second reason is that such countries may differ
substantively over their national grant rates.90 Both these methodological
partialities are mostly solved by USPTO-based patenting statistics based on
the ICN search category whereby issued patents are sampled.
Indeed, the probable importance of a future designed uniformed Triadic
Inventor Country Nationality search category certainly would support the fact
that most R&D-related activity is concentrated in these geo-political regions.91
Yet, on the other hand, a mitigating finding in support of this study’s USPTObased analysis holds that on average only between ten and fifteen percent of
patent priority filings become triadic patents in the first place, whereas for the
rest there is USPTO dominance for issued patents by foreign inventors.92
A third methodological principle follows. It employs a calculation
method according to which total domestic intramural expenditure on R&D
during a given period by both advanced and emerging economies country
groups is expressed in Purchasing Power Parity United States Dollars by 2005
constant prices.93 This calculation of competing national rates by currency
88. See Statistics Manual, supra note 85.
89. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 51 (Zed Books 2000);
PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR
CLIENTS XIV (Cambridge University Press 2010) (“we do not know much about how developing
country patent offices administer the standard of patentability that arrive in their countries through
various treaty processes.”).
90. See, e.g., Dominique Guellec and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Impact of
Public R&D Expenditure on Business R&D, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working
Papers 2000/4, OECD Publishing (2000) 8, 9.
91. Jacques Gaillard, Measuring R&D in Developing Countries: Main Characteristics and
Implications for the Frascati Manual, 15 SCIENCE, IN TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY 77, 81 (2010).
92. G. de Rassenfosse, J. Danguy and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note 78, at
13; Statistics Manual, supra note 85.
93. Glossary - 63 terms for science & technology, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC &
CULTURAL ORG. (last visited May 25, 2014), http://glossary.uis.unesco.org/glossary/map/terms/177
[hereinafter Glossary]. As the UNESCO report explains, this methodology was adapted from the
Franscati Manual. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPENDIUM OF PATENT
STATISTICS, FRASCATI MANUAL: PROPOSED STANDARD PRACTICE FOR SURVEYS ON RESEARCH
AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT § 423 (6th. ed. 2002) [hereinafter FRASCATI MANUAL].
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conversion into United States Dollars largely eliminates the differences in
price levels among countries and country groups.94
Moreover, when expenditure on Gross National Product (GNP) for
different national price indices is converted into a common currency by means
of the PPP per 2005 constant prices, it is in effect expressed at the same set of
national prices so that comparisons between countries reflect only differences
in the volume of GERD-related goods and services purchased. This method
thereby normalizes the patent propensity rate comparison between energizing
and advanced country group classifications.95
This study abides by a fourth methodological principle. Based on the
dataset generated, the study has thus far used two competing clustering
methods, which gave nearly, but not exactly, the same clustering results. First
to be used was a K-means method, which produced a plot within the group’s
sum of squares by number of clusters extracted to help determine the
appropriate number of clusters. The result of this method was that no clear
conclusion was found for sixty-six innovating countries used for the model.
The analysis then used the Ward’s Hierarchical Clustering test with a
Euclidean distance matrix. The latter test indicated a three cluster solution
according to the K-means: an appropriate scattered plot matched by a two
Dendogram chart detailing country participations in the three convergence
clubs for both the first and last year in the time series, namely 1996 and 2011,
respectively.
A fifth methodology applies. Accordingly, statistical imputation is used
to resolve patterns of patenting of GERD-related missingness for each year,
country and country group. Patent data at the USPTO website is available
with no missing values for the entire sixteen years between 1996 and 2011.
GERD-related data covers the fifteen years between 1996 and 2010 with
missing values. In a few country cases, no reliable imputation is possible,
since the range of time for which data is available is too narrow, such as in the
case of the GERD date from the Philippines. Whenever imputation
methodology is statistically permissible, the following rules are appropriate:
firstly, if there is missing data before the first available data point, the study
uses the rule “first data carried before,” thereby assigning the same value to
all data points before the first available. Secondly, if there is missing data
after the last available data point, the study uses the rule “last data carried
over,” thereby assigning the same value to all data points after the last one
available. Thirdly, if there is missing data between two data points, the study
uses an interpolation between the two data points.
94. Glossary, supra note 93.
95. Id.
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As a whole, the methodology used in the model adheres to the
conceptualization and critique put forth by two constituting OECD statistical
manuals. The first is the OECD Frascati Manual (2002) on R&D & GERDrelated statistics.96 The second manual is the OECD/Eurostat Oslo Manual
(2005) on innovation-related statistics.97 In principle, both jointly lay
emphasis on the need to move beyond normative posturing by stakeholders,
role players and policy makers and toward empirical observations. The
OECD’s Frascati Manual certainly is the de facto standard for the
internationally comparable measurement of R&D & GERD of OECD member
states and associated observer states for the last fifty years.98 It is funneled by
two additional, noticeable OECD manuals. The first of two is the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Technical Paper No. 5, titled: Measuring R&D: Challenges Faced by
Developing Countries from 2010.99 This manual provides guidance on a
number of methodological challenges that are relevant to developing countries
and which may have not been elaborated clearly enough in the Frascati
Manual. The second of two is the OECD’s Patent Statistics Manual of
2009,100 which provides users and producers of patent statistics with basic
guidelines used herein for compiling and analyzing such data. Both manuals
confirm the Frascati Manual as the most widely accepted international
standard practice for R&D & GERD-related surveys.101
B. Findings
1. The Null Hypothesis (H0): Patent Propensity Clusters
The null hypothesis, H0, represents this article’s main argument whereby
countries worldwide converge into numerous convergence clubs over their
propensity to patent as proxy for their domestic innovation.102
The first finding described in Tables 1–3 below leads to the identification
of three innovation convergence clubs with markedly different levels of
96. FRASCATI MANUAL, supra note 93.
97. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OSLO MANUAL: PROPOSED
GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION DATA (3rd ed.
2005).
98. UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., MEASURING R&D:
CHALLENGES FACED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2010) [hereinafter MEASURING R&D].
99. Id.
100. Statistics Manual, supra note 85.
101. MEASURING R&D, supra note 98. This article adheres to these methodologies while
entailing a series of statistical analysis using Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software.
102. This null hypothesis sets the default assumption thereof, either because it is believed to
be true or because it is to be used as a basis for argument, but has not been proved.
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propensity to patent rates. Table 1 refers to the first point of measurement,
labeled “first time,” in which the Ward Hierarchical Clustering analysis scaled
as log ratio of Patents per GERD over scaled GERD has been accounted for.
Table 1 indicates the existence of two large patent propensity-gaps in the
world economy: the first refers to the great distance that separates the middle
group of “followers” from the stronger “leaders” in terms of patent propensity
capabilities; the second similarly refers to the impressive gap that separates
the weaker “marginalized” from the followers clubs.
Convergence among the leaders, which has received the most attention in
the literature, is indeed more prevalent than within the intermediate followers
range. Tables 2 and 3, titled “Country Clusters Dendogram” at “first time”
and “last time,” respectively, further show alongside Table 4 below (whereby
leaders are labeled as Cluster 3 colored in blue), that the cluster of leaders in
1996 includes merely twenty countries out of which only seventeen OECD
countries are accounted for and two emerging economies, namely Thailand
and Malaysia, were included. As of 1996, the latter fifty percent of OECDs
initially converged with the followers convergence club—that is, while slicing
OCDC advanced countries into two noteworthy halves over what remains an
unaccounted for OECD patent propensity divide. By 2011 Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Norway join in.
For the followers convergence club alongside Table 4 below (whereby
followers are labeled as Cluster 2 colored in green), the findings questions the
depiction of the twenty-four Emerging Economies listed by the IMF as of 16
July 2012,103 as the inclusive intermediary innovative country group
classification. Notably, by 2011 a mere three out of twenty-four of the
Emerging Economies, namely Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania, were made
part of the followers cluster. Alongside this minority of Emerging
Economies, numerous other less-developing countries, namely Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Kyrgystan, and Moldova, maintain both leadership within
developing countries as well as potential intermediacy between the leaders
and marginalized convergence clubs—within the followers cluster.104
What remains significant throughout the time series between 1996 and
2011 is that none of the four BRIC economies—Brazil, Russia, India, and
China—belonged to the followers cluster. Instead, these four iconic political
leaders of the developing world and the twenty-four Emerging Economies
therein belonged to the third and less innovative marginalized cluster (labeled
103. INT’L. MONETARY FUND, World Economic Outlook Update: New Setbacks, Further
Policy Action Needed (16 July 2012), at http://www.imf.org/external /data.htm, at 4 & fn. 3 (listing
emerging economies) [hereinafter IMF].
104. The Followers cluster further included four advanced economies: Greece, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Iceland. See infra Table 4.

BENOLIEL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

324

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

6/23/2014 1:40 PM

[Vol. 18:2

as Cluster 1 and colored in red in Tables 1–3). That is the case given their
surprisingly low propensity to patent rates as proxy for their domestic
innovation rates, notwithstanding their leadership within the G-20 and other
developing countries-led WTO coalitions over the TRIPS Agreement, as has
been explained.
For the marginalized country group, alongside Table 4 below, the findings
show numerous competing findings. Firstly, a majority of accounted for
Emerging Economies belonged by 2011 to the marginalized cluster. These
included the four BRIC countries, as well as Ukraine, Pakistan, Argentina,
Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, and Poland. Moreover, alongside the IMFs
Less Developing Country group classification, numerous other developing
countries joined by 2011 and noticeably sub-Saharan Burkina Faso, Egypt,
and Sri Lanka. Lastly, among the marginalized group, by 2011, numerous
OECDs were to be found. These included Spain, Portugal, and the Czech
Republic.105 Albeit empirically distinct per the propensity to patent
breakdown, the characteristics of these clubs partly resemble those of the triad
“innovation,” “imitation,” and “stagnation” groups identified following
Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes’ model and the deriving empirical
findings by Fulvio Castellacci, offering broad technology-propensity results
of a three cluster analysis.106
For the leaders convergence club, the findings suggest that even among
the thirty-four OECD countries or the analogous thirty two Advanced
Economies listed by the IMF as of 16 July 2012,107 convergence over patent
propensity is not apparent. In other words, there is evidence of club
convergence even within the economies of the OECD. Resembling Canova’s
2004 findings on the club convergence over income rate-related economic
growth, this article shows that the initially-categorized follower countries in
the OECD diverge from the initially remaining twenty leader countries. The
latter are those which form the exclusive and enduring convergence club

105. Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Switzerland, and Luxemburg, which are OECD countries, were
not accounted for in this study for lack of consistent GERD-related statistics on their behalf. Partial
measurements did indicate, however, that Cyprus and Malta were close to belonging formally to the
marginalized cluster.
106. Fulvio Castellacci, Convergence and Divergence among Technology Clubs 25 (Danish
Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 06-21, 2006) (supporting the idea of “the
existence of clubs of countries characterized by different levels of technological development and
different technological dynamics.”); see also Philippe Aghion et al., The Effect of Financial
Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence, 120 Q. J. ECON. 173, 173 (2005) (presenting
evidence whereby “any country with more than some critical level of financial development will
converge to the growth rate of the world technology frontier, and that all other countries will have a
strictly lower long-run growth rate”).
107. IMF, supra note 103, at fn. 4.
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throughout the entire period.108 This article thus contradicts findings on
income-related economic growth, especially following Barro’s work. In his
1991 publication, he argues that over a nearly forty-year period (1950–1988)
convergence was restricted to OECD countries, while it was almost absent
between the OECD and the less developed countries.109

Table 1: Scattered Plot by Country Clusters at First Time 1996/2000
Offering Ward Hierarchical Clustering (Scaled Log Ratio of
Patent/GERD Per Scaled GERD)
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108. Fabio Canova, Testing for Convergence Clubs in Income Per Capita: A Predictive
Density Approach, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 49, 49 (2004); see also Sala-i-Martin, supra note 14, at
1029.
109. Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q. J. ECON.,
407, 420 (1991); see also Sala-i-Martin, supra note 14; Steve Dowrick & Norman Gemmell,
Industrialization, Catching Up and Economic Growth: A Comparative Study Across the World’s
Capitalist Countries, 101 ECON. J. 263 (1991); Steve Dowrick & Duc-Tho Nguyen, OECD
Comparative Economic Growth 1950-85: Catch Up and Convergence, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1010
(1989).
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Table 2: Country Clusters Dendogram at First Time 1996/2000
Cluster Dendrogram
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d
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Table 3: Country Clusters Dendogram at End Time 2007/2011
Cluster Dendrogram
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Table 4: List of Countries/Cluster Transitions between First time-End
Time
Obs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Country
Name
Argentina
Brazil
Belarus
China
Czech Rep.
Spain
India
Mexico
Pakistan
Poland
Portugal
Russian F.
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
S. Africa
Colombia
Ecuador
Egypt
Greece
Romania
Serbia
Slovenia
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Hungary
Norway
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Burkina F.
Costa Rica
Iceland
Kyrgyzstan

Country
Code
AR
BR
BY
CN
CZ
ES
IN
MX
PK
PL
PT
RU
TN
TR
UA
ZA
CO
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GR
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RS
SI
SK
BG
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BF
CR
IS
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Cluster
Transition
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
12
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12
12
12
12
13
13
13
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22
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22

Cluster
1996
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
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Cluster
2011
1
1
1
1
1
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
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Kuwait
Sri Lanka
Lithuania
Latvia
Moldova
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Mongolia
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Trinidad T.
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2. The First Hypothesis (H1): Inter-Cluster Convergence
The H1 hypothesis follows. Table 5 confirms the assumption according
to which a narrowing of the overall spectrum with both the followers and
especially the marginalized cluster occurs. It shows a mild upward
convergence on behalf of both the followers and marginalized towards the
leaders. This transition is accounted for by each of the cluster’s means of
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scaled log ratio of patents to GERD as they change over time. It shows a
relatively stable pattern regarding the means, with a consistently high mean
corresponding to leaders and lower means correlating with the other two
clusters. The final relative position as of 2011 of the three means changed,
however, compared with their initial position. What is mostly evident is that
towards the end of the period, the marginalized mean approaches the other
two over their propensity to patent rates as proxy of their domestic
innovation rates.
This finding contradicts recurring “catch-up” theories in the literature and
the emblematic Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder warning against the
widening of the model north-south innovation gap presumably fostered by
the TRIPS agreement.110 Indeed, the highest incidence of overall intercluster convergence is not on behalf of the leaders convergence club; rather,
it is among the world’s marginalized one.
Table 5: Cluster Means vs. Time
Cluster means vs time
Cluster Mean of Scaled log ratio of patents to gerd
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110. HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 67 (2002) (arguing that today’s
productivity gap between developed and developing countries is wider than the one in earlier times);
CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A SKEPTICAL VIEW (2002) (discussing a possible
growth in the gap since the enactment of the TRIPS agreement); see generally Carlota Perez & Luc
L. Soete, Catching-Up in Technology: Entry Barriers and Windows of Opportunity, in TECHNICAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY, (Giovanni Dosi ed., 1988) (discussing related “catch-up”
literature).
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3. The Second Hypothesis (H2): Intra-Cluster Convergence
The H2 hypothesis brings the article’s findings to an important competing
finding. The finding of Table 6 below is thus twofold: to begin with, it
foretells how numerous countries that initially started as marginalized have
moved and changed their position to followers. In contrast, however, Table 6
shows that with the exception of one country, Kazakhstan, countries that
were followers or leaders did not regress in their convergence club ranking
between 1996 and 2011. In other words, the aggregated propensity to patent
worldwide advances slowly yet positively.
In the final analysis in Table 4 above, the article defines five groups of
countries which account for intra-cluster convergences. These include those
that were initially in cluster 1 (Marginalized cluster based on initial period as
of 1996) and that remained in the second clustering period as of 2011
(labeled 11). A second group were those that were initially in cluster 1 and
moved by 2011 to cluster 2 (the followers cluster based on initial period as of
1996, labeled 12). A third group, depicted in Table 4 above, are of those that
were initially in cluster 1 and moved by 2011 to cluster 3 (the leaders cluster
based on initial period as of 1996, labeled 13). A fourth group of countries
are those that were initially in cluster 2 and that remained there as of 2011
(labeled 22). The fifth and last group described in Table 4 above is of those
that were initially in cluster 3 and those that stayed there by 2011 (labeled
33).
As the combination of Tables 5 and 6 depicts, there has been a
noteworthy upward convergence transition from twenty-seven marginalized
countries in 1996, to sixteen in 2011; and from 41 percent of countries to 26
percent of them by 2011. This sharp decrease foretells the transformation of
eight countries to followers by 2011, including Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt,
Greece, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Slovakia. In addition, three
countries noticeably made full transition from being part of the marginalized
cluster into the leaders cluster (cluster 3 labeled 13 above) –Bulgaria,
Hungary and Norway.
This finding depicts Ben David’s upward convergence, a case of lesser
club members—followers and marginalized—catching up with advanced
members, or leaders, herein. These findings correspond with recent analyses
focused almost exclusively on income-related indications of endogenous
growth theory. They indicate that unlike orthodox neoclassical models, as
shown by Martin and Sunley, regional convergence rates are much slower on
the whole.
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Table 6: Five Cluster Means vs. Time
Cluster means vs time
Cluster Mean of Scaled log ratio of patents to gerd
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(Scaled Log Ratio of Pat/GERD Per Cluster)
III. THEORETICAL RAMIFICATIONS
The core empirical findings above moderately correspond with catch-up
literature concerning the pulling of other countries through a technology
“catch-up” effect. In a recently published, seminal article by Harvard
University economist Jérôme Vandenbussche and others, the authors assess
that the strength of this “catch-up” effect on the developing countries’
frontier in fact decreases with the level of domestic technological creation.111
As a result, it is presumed that technology creation by domestic firms
becomes progressively more important as a country moves closer to the
technology frontier whereby technology diffusion and absorption decline—
or in other words, as catching up possibly translates into increasingly smaller
technological improvement protected through incremental patenting
activity.112
Yet, thus far, this endogenous growth analysis has remained
overwhelmingly theoretical. Its validation in our case indeed is acute mostly
at the regional level.113 As the evidence suggests, the key factors stressed by
endogenous growth theory, namely guaranteeing increasing returns, human
capital and domestic technology creation, develop unevenly and could be
differentiated locally and regionally114 However, as stated above, earlier
111. Vandenbussche, supra note 12, at 104–06; see Hassan, supra note 13, at 17 (providing
additional general discussion of the argument.).
112. Hassan, supra note 12, at 17. The present paper leaves the latter argument concerning
incremental patenting outside of its scope.
113. Martin & Sunley, supra note 11, at 220.
114. Martin & Sunley, supra, note 11, at 220.
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accounts of endogenous growth theory’s relationship to club convergence
between country groups, to be sure, have mostly contributed to the
understanding of archetypical club convergence over salaries, GDP and other
macroeconomic income-related indications.115
It is unclear why endogenous convergence between country groups or
clubs over domestic state-of-the-art-technology creation exists. Similarly,
not much is known about how the latter is achieved.116 Moreover, very little
is conceptually attributed to explaining how technological creation of
country group clusters is determined.117
In fact, the only certain findings of this article concerning club
convergence negate regional divergence between advanced and emerging
economies. In other words, this article demonstrates slow regional
convergence of innovation, especially by developing countries which are not
emerging economies towards advanced ones, measured through patent
propensity rates.118 Table 4 above shows how in fact sixty-one percent of all
accounted for Emerging Economy countries remained in the marginalized
cluster for the period 1996–2011.119
Notwithstanding the present empirical absence concerning the exact
growth model, it being exogenous or endogenous, this article indicates that
market forces potentially have failed in disequilibrating the leaders
convergence club in their relative country group’s progression towards a
patent propensity which characterizes two-thirds of advanced economies, as
explained above. These highly-innovative countries continuously converged
throughout the measured time series period. Moreover, in certain analogies
to income-based growth, findings correspond with Baumol and Wolff’s

115. Dan Ben-David, Convergence Clubs and Diverging Economies 1 (CEPR Discussion
Paper, 1997) (concluding that “income gaps have increased within most possible groupings of
countries in the world. Where ‘convergence clubs’ tend to be more prevalent is at the two ends of
the income spectrum.”).
116. See Martin & Sunley, supra note 11, at 210 (citing Gould & Ruffin, supra note 13;
Convergence across, supra note 13). Such diffusion of technology requires accordingly that lagging
emerging economies would have appropriate infrastructure or conditions to adopt or absorb
technological innovations. ALEXIADIS, supra note 13, at 61, Sec. 4.5 (for a supportive economic
model). For two of the earliest and most influential statements of this view, see BORTS & STEIN,
supra note 13 (offering a classic study of regional development in the United States); Williamson,
supra note 13 (analyzing the evolution of regional income differences in advanced industrial
countries).
117. See ALEXIADIS, supra note 13, at 61 & Sec. 4.5 (for a supportive economic model).
118. But see Martin & Sunley, supra note 11, at 201 (“predict[ing] that regional incomes will
tend to diverge, because market forces, if left to their own devices, are spatially disequilibrating.”)
(citing Economic Space, supra note 18; Perroux, supra note 18; MYRDAL, supra note 19; Case for
Regional Policies, supra note 20) (providing comparable income-related findings).
119. These were the four BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as well as Argentina,
South Africa, Turkey, Poland, Ukraine, Pakistan, and Mexico. See supra Table 4.
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utilization of data from seventy-two countries demonstrating that middle
income countries (seventeen out of seventy-two countries in the sample),
mostly corresponding to the marginalized cluster (particularly emerging
economies beginning in the mid-1990s), have grown the fastest.120
Finally, one has to entertain the possibility that in the long run,
comparable patent propensity rates as proxy of domestic innovation rates by
advanced and emerging economies may uphold club divergence. Such
divergence may exist instead of convergence due to possible deep
international incompatibilities in economic integration.
CONCLUSION
Accounting for sixty-six innovating countries worldwide over the time
series period between 1996 and 2011, the article offers three empirical
findings. The first one leads towards the identification of three domestic
innovation-related convergence clubs with markedly different levels of
propensity to patent rates. It shows two large patent propensity-gaps in the
world economy: the first refers to the great distance that separates the middle
group of “followers” from the stronger “leaders” in terms of patent
propensity capabilities; the second similarly refers to the impressive gap that
separates the weaker “marginalized” from the followers clubs.
Furthermore, the first finding offers numerous insights. To begin with,
the leaders cluster included in 1996 merely twenty countries including only
seventeen OECD countries out of thirty-two. With the joining of Norway as
of 2011, the latter fifty percent of OECDs defined the followers convergence
club as a stable yet inflexible group of twenty one highly innovative OECD
countries (alongside non-OECD Bulgaria and Hungary to join the leaders
cluster by 2011). That is, while effectively slicing OCDC advanced
countries into two halves over what remains an unaccounted for OECD
patent propensity-related innovation divide.
As for the followers convergence club, the first finding further questions
the depiction of the twenty-four emerging economies listed by the IMF, as of
16 July 2012, as the ultimate intermediary innovative country group
classification. What remains significant throughout the time series is that
none of the four BRIC economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, and China

120. See William J. Baumol & Edward N. Wolff, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and
Welfare: Reply, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1155, 1156–57 (1988) (contrasting with the trajectory for the
marginalized convergence club herein, and while using an income-related growth analysis, Baumol
further upholds that the poorest countries have diverged from the others); see also Hollis Chenery &
Moshe Syrquin, Typical Patterns of Transformation, in INDUSTRIALIZATION AND GROWTH: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 37 (Hollis Chenery, Sherman Robinson & Moshe Syrquin, eds., 1986)
(combining time-series and cross-sectional data for several countries while finding divergence
among the poorer countries and convergence among the relatively wealthier countries).
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belonged to the followers cluster. Instead, these four rising political leaders
within the developing world, and the twenty-four Emerging Economies
therein, belonged to the third and less innovative marginalized cluster.
The article upholds a second finding concerning convergence between the
three abovementioned convergence clubs. It adheres to the finding by which
convergence among leaders, which have received the most attention in the
literature, is indeed more prevalent than it is within the intermediate
followers range. Yet the highest incidence of convergence towards the
overall the global patent propensity mean is not done on behalf of the leaders
convergence club; rather, it is done by the weaker marginalized one.
The third finding follows; it foretells how numerous countries that
initially began as marginalized have moved and changed their position to
followers. In contrast, however, it shows that except for Kazakhstan,
countries that were followers or leaders did not regress in their convergence
club ranking by 2011. In other words, the aggregated propensity to patent
worldwide advances slowly yet positively. This finding depicts Ben David’s
upward convergence, a case of lesser club members—followers and mostly
marginalized—catching up with advanced members, referred to herein as
leaders.
These findings correspond with recent analyses focused almost
exclusively on endogenous growth theory income-related indications. They
suggest that unlike orthodox neoclassical models, as shown by Martin and
Sunley, regional convergence rates are also much slower on the whole.
Lastly, this article’s analysis implies numerous theoretical ramifications,
primarily relating to the need for further explanation of the remaining
intricacies in accounting for shifts and reversals in rates of regional
convergence. Such discrepancies arise from the fact that there remains little
to account for the slowness or nonexistence of inner (codenamed, intra-) club
convergence, especially in advanced economies, but also in emerging ones.
In terms of economic outcomes, it also remains unclear how a selection of a
few countries in Latin America, coastal Africa, and the former Soviet bloc
have dropped out of the marginalized convergence club as it is at least as
impressive as it is unclear how a selection of countries have progressed from
the followers one onto the leaders one. Finally, the article’s findings beg
further explanation of how, given that only half of OECD countries are
members of the leaders convergence club, it remains small yet stable.

